

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has reviewed the pleadings and other papers herein along with the attached Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge.

IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment are denied; and (3) the matter is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security Administration for further administrative action.

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1 | IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve forthwith a copy of this Order, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and the Judgment by United States mail on the Plaintiff, counsel for Plaintiff and on the United States Attorney for the Central District of California. STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 HENRY DAVIDIAN, 11 NO. CV 06-7801-CAS(E) 12 Plaintiff, 13 ν. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF 14 JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 15 16 Defendant. 17 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable 18 Christina A. Snyder, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District 20 Court for the Central District of California. 21 22 23 PROCEEDINGS 24 25 Plaintiff filed a complaint on December 8, 2006, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits. 26 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2007. 27 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2007.

Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed December 11, 2006.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Plaintiff, a former physician, asserts disability since
August 1, 1999, based primarily on fatigue allegedly resulting from
Lyme disease (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 60-62, 288-90).
Plaintiff testified to fatigue of disabling severity (A.R. 288-90).
Plaintiff's treating internist, Dr. Pitchon, opined Plaintiff is
totally disabled (A.R. 259-61).

The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") stated that Plaintiff "appears sincere with respect to his testimony on subjective matters," but ultimately found such testimony "not entirely credible . . ." (A.R. 19, 21). The ALJ rejected Dr. Pitchon's opinion as allegedly insufficiently supported (A.R. 20). The ALJ apparently did not attempt to recontact Dr. Pitchon for a clarification of the bases for Dr. Pitchon's opinion.

The ALJ denied benefits (A.R. 18-22). The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 4-6).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine if: (1) the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the

Commissioner used proper legal standards. <u>See Swanson v. Secretary</u>, 763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985).

DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, the Court should remand this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section $405\,(g)$.

The ALJ erred in connection with the evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility. When an ALJ determines that a claimant's testimony regarding subjective symptoms is not credible, the ALJ must make "specific, cogent" findings, supported in the record, to justify the ALJ's determination. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996); Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990); Varney v. Secretary, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1988).

In the present case, the body of the ALJ's decision appears to have rejected Plaintiff's credibility merely because "the disabling nature of the impairment does not appear to be fully supported by objective findings and treatment records" (A.R. 19). An alleged inconsistency between a claimant's testimony regarding subjective

In the absence of evidence of "malingering," many Ninth Circuit cases have applied the arguably more rigorous "clear and convincing" standard. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003); Ballard v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1899797 *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2000) (collecting cases). In the present case, the ALJ's findings do not pass muster under either the "specific, cogent" standard or the "clear and convincing" standard, so any distinction between the two standards is academic.

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symptomatology and the objective medical record is a legally insufficient basis for rejecting a claimant's credibility. See

Varney v. Secretary, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1988) (ALJ may not discredit excess symptom testimony "solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence"). The

"findings" section of the ALJ's opinion refers to "the degree of medical treatment required, discrepancies between the claimant's assertions and information contained in the documentary reports, the reports of the treating and examining practitioners, and the medical history" (A.R. 21). These vague, generalized references add little or nothing to the body of the ALJ's decision. The ALJ thus failed to discharge the ALJ's obligation to make "specific, cogent" findings, supported in the record, to justify the ALJ's credibility determination.

The ALJ also erred in connection with the evaluation of Dr. Pitchon's opinion. A treating physician's opinion "must be given substantial weight." Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) ("the ALJ must give sufficient weight to the subjective aspects of a doctor's opinion . . . This is especially true when the opinion is that of a treating physician") (citation omitted). Even where the treating physician's opinion is contradicted, "if the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician he . . . must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that

Rejection of an uncontradicted opinion of a treating physician requires a statement of "clear and convincing" reasons. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1984).

are based on substantial evidence in the record." Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation, quotations and brackets omitted); see Rodriquez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d at 762 ("The ALJ may disregard the treating physician's opinion, but only by setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so, and this decision must itself be based on substantial evidence") (citation and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) ("broad and vague" reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinions do not suffice).3

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Section 404.1512(e) of 20 C.F.R. provides that the Administration "will seek additional evidence or clarification from your medical source when the report from your medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not contain all of the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) ("If the ALJ thought he needed to know the basis of Dr. Hoeflich's opinions in order to evaluate them, he had a duty to conduct an appropriate inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or submitting further questions to them. He could also

Contrary to Defendant's apparent argument, 23 contradiction of a treating physician's opinion by consultative physicians does not satisfy the requirement of stating specific, 24 legitimate reasons for rejecting a treating physician's opinion. Subsequent to the decision cited by Defendant (Andrews v. Shalala, 25 53 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1995)), the Ninth Circuit has reiterated 26

that the Administration always must state specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting the contradicted opinions of treating physicians. See, e.g., Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (reading Andrews more narrowly than Defendant apparently

urges).

have continued the hearing to augment the record") (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983) ("the ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered"). In the present case, the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Pitchon's opinion as allegedly unsupported without first attempting to recontact Dr. Pitchon regarding the bases for the opinion. Id.

Remand, rather than reversal, is appropriate in the present case. When a court reverses an administrative determination, "the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation." INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (citations and quotations omitted). Remand is proper where, as here, additional administrative proceedings could remedy the defects in the decision. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see generally Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (remand is an option where the ALJ stated invalid reasons for rejecting a claimant's excess pain testimony).

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000) ("Harman") does not compel a reversal rather than a remand of the present case. In Harman, the Ninth Circuit stated that improperly rejected medical opinion evidence should be credited and an immediate award of

The Court has not reached any of the other issues raised by Plaintiff, except insofar as to determine that Plaintiff's arguments in favor of reversal rather than remand are unpersuasive.

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benefits directed where "(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally
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      sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no
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      outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of
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      disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the
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      ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such
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      evidence credited." Harman at 1178 (citations and quotations
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      omitted). Assuming, arguendo, the <u>Harman</u> holding survives the
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      Supreme Court's decision in <u>INS v. Ventura</u>, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002), 5
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     the <u>Harman</u> holding does not direct reversal of the present case.
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     Here, the ALJ must recontact Dr. Pitchon concerning "outstanding
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     issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can
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     be made." Further, it is not clear from the record that the ALJ
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     would be required to find Plaintiff disabled for the entire claimed
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     period of disability were the opinion of Dr. Pitchon credited.
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               The Ninth Circuit has continued to apply <a href="Harman"><u>Harman</u></a>, despite
          <u>Ventura</u>.
                      See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th
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    Cir. 2004).
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RECOMMENDATION For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) denying Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment; and (3) directing that the matter be remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security Administration for further administrative action. DATED: July 9, 2007. /s/ CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.